

Thus Spoke Franco: The Place of History in the Making of Foreign Policy

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The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting
Milan Kundera (1981, 3)

Yesterday's and tomorrow's history is yet to be written¹
Antonio Machado (1997, 155)
El Dios Ibero

Introduction

In this chapter I explore the foreign policy² of Spain under the Franco regime. My revisiting of the Franco regime and its foreign policy is premised on the assumption that rule-oriented constructivism has much light to shed upon both.³ Such an exploration also allows me to engage in a dialogue with the past. The willingness of any society to face its past, I will argue, is an indication of the strength of its democracy. From the outset of Spain's still-young democracy, many have argued against establishing any dialogue with the past, fearful that one would be opening a Pandora's box that can hold only resentment and hostility. Yet without such a dialogue, many of the present debates about Spanish historiography are meaningless, as is any conceptual discussion of foreign policy that does not elucidate the origins, (i.e., history) of present policy. Thus, I hope to contribute not only to the development of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), but also to the elucidation of an important period of Spanish history.

At the expense of reiteration, I will offer a brief and general characterization of constructivism. I will then articulate the specific premises upon which this chapter relies and develop a basic organizational plan to explore the foreign policy of the Franco regime. Thereafter, I will advance some preliminary thoughts on the relationship between forms of rule and regime type. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion of the *politics of memory* and its relevance for foreign policy and constructivism.

At its barest, rule-oriented constructivism holds that "people and societies construct or constitute, each other" (Onuf 1989, 36).⁴ This process is called *co-constitution* and takes place through speech acts (assertive, directive, and commissive), which in turn yield three types of rules: instruction, directive, and commitment rules. These rules emerge as speakers perceive that what they collectively say to each other and do as a result begins to rise to the level of convention and to contain added normativity.⁵ Broadly stated, speech acts can be defined as "the act of speaking in a form that gets someone else to act" (Onuf 1998, 66). For this reason, constructivists believe that language has performative capacities. In other words, "*speaking is doing.*" If this is so, these rules are at once

instances of behavior as well as social acts. [...] and they occur at the nexus of biology, psychology, and sociology. But constructivists take biological, psychological, or social performance one step further. They argue that people strive not only to make sense out of their world and to act within it, but also to communicate their understandings to others. At the same time, the process of communication is a process of making sense. This extends the syllogism offered above: speaking *is* doing *is* knowing. As communication is a social act, so is knowledge. This is precisely the bridge that constructivism offers between *ontology* (the socially constructed world) and *epistemology* (our ability to know something about it). (Kowert 1998, 104; emphasis in the original)

Thus, I see the production of knowledge, and particularly the formulation of knowledge claims, as a historically and socioeconomically situated process, rather than as an aseptic and harmonious production of theories by seemingly impersonal and ahistorical agents. This stance, which I believe to be congruent with constructivism, has paramount methodological and *epistemological* implications, Onuf's and Kubálková's assertions to the contrary notwithstanding.⁶ This position bears witness to the social nature of knowledge. More importantly, if knowledge is social, the traditional debate in philosophy (as well as all of its spillover debates into the social sciences) between rationalists and empiricists shifts ground, and the foundations that both camps so eagerly searched for, and thereby erected, crumble in the absence of an empty slate for sensory data or presocial ideas. What we are left with is the capacity to use linguistic categories embedded in the neurological, mostly unconscious, functions of the brain to construct ourselves, and to be constructed, through our interaction with others.⁷

Having briefly sketched the basics of the constructivist ontology, I will now postulate that foreign and public policy are not separate domains, but rather different facets of the generation of *rule*, a premise shared by some of the other contributors to this book. Once the separation between public and foreign policy is overcome, the separation between domestic and foreign/international politics is also called into question. This chapter renounces both dualisms.⁸ When policy is formulated, whether public or foreign, its constituent parts are always the same: linguistic performances⁹ (declarations, affirmations, commitments, etc.) intended to bring about a state of affairs by eliciting some form of response to them, understanding passive and oppressive compliance as a form of negative response.¹⁰

My investigation relies on a careful consideration of the linguistic performances made by Franco during the course of his regime (see appendix for a sample). Analyzing these performances will shed light on the regime's intentions and the coherence of its policy goals.¹¹ Yet to speak of policy goals, one must first deal with the thorny question of what a policy is. I resolved to overcome much of the conceptual ambiguity of the term "policy" by focusing on the use of language in formal settings where highly specific statements are issued. We find here the ontological source of both public and foreign policy (see Onuf's chapter in this book).

It is easier to bridge the conceptual distance between dictatorships and questions of legitimacy, power, and memory, but what can dictatorships contribute to debates about policy? Dictatorships illuminate more clearly the intricate links between public and foreign policy, because they concentrate decision-making in fewer hands, reducing thereby the scope of actors to consider as sources of policy. The sense of grandiose historical destiny conveyed by Franco's linguistic performances (the notion of *Hispanidad* and its use by Franco is one of the most visible examples) and his largely uncontested leadership after Spain's civil war also provide a magnifying glass that clarifies the sources of policy, the interplay between domestic and foreign politics, and the impact of external and domestic constraints upon policy. This seems to suggest that a criterion for the selection of policy statements and actors needs to be accompanied by a historical narrative of the context of rule surrounding policy statements.

Thus, I argue that the historiography of Franco's regime, and our understanding of his policies, can also benefit from a narrative that relates how the dictatorship justified its origins, explained its "unavoidable" evolution in the quest for survival and witnessed its eventual decay¹² as an exhausted dictatorship. Here I hope to show how one may proceed to carry out a historically informed inquiry into the field of foreign policy. While the study of such a long period of *rule* poses many challenges, my focus on foreign policy provides a thread through time

with which to weave together the different stages of the regime. This is so because Franco saw foreign policy as one more instrument to legitimate and perpetuate his stay in power¹³ (Armero 1978). Even though this chapter is intended as an exercise in “foreign policy analysis” rather than as a reappraisal of the regime, it will become obvious that much of the narrative also addresses, if only as a necessity posed by the inherent link between public and foreign policy, the nature of the regime itself.

For the sake of clarity, this chapter is divided into two sections, a historical narrative of the foreign policy of the Franco regime and a constructivist analysis thereof. This division is arbitrary, however, since each part depends heavily on the other. The explicit link between the two sections is my understanding (1) of history as the contested ground where the struggles over the collective memory of a people play themselves out (Cox 1981)¹⁴; and (2) of social arrangements as the more or less institutionalized spaces where agents deploy rules in a parallel and ongoing process of contestation. In short, our understanding of history has consequences for the social body in that it informs future deployments of one’s agency. Our understanding of how social relations work, *how rule is generated and maintained*, influences the historical accounts we provide as well as our notions of the role that language plays in them. I develop this position about the relationship between history and social action elsewhere under the label of “historical constructivism” (Porcel 2001).

Historical constructivism advocates a type of social theory that becomes “empirical” by placing greater emphasis on language use in context. As an approach, it represents my attempt to see where memory intercepts with language, how they mutually constitute each other, and how this process allows for the formulation of a more empirical constructivism. By “empirical” I do not wish to postulate the possibility of falsification, but rather the evaluation of knowledge claims against the contextual backdrop from which they emerged. Context, as Fierke shows, does not unveil mechanisms of causality or solves the puzzles that surround social action, but it does give us some clues as to what explanations of the puzzle are even plausible under a given set of circumstances and actors (Fierke 1998). Context, by demanding that we look at specific events and give meaningful accounts of them, directs our attention to the interplay between the synchronic and diachronic aspects of the process of social construction. By looking at the temporality of rules and how it affects their institutionalization, we find new and important ways to break into the process by which agents and structures constitute each other. Context forces us to pay attention to how language is used in the specific practices and rituals that make up social life. Memories are frail and often fail, but where memories fail, many language practices, and the rules to which they give rise, survive.

Whenever possible, I will refer readers to specific statements and declarations of policy that they may wish to explore on their own. After all, reading is also a social activity, even if not often thought of in those terms. As such, it positions the reader as an active agent in the process of social construction: she can criticize a text or acquiesce to its content (I see indifference as a form of intended or unintended acquiescence). Regardless of which route the reader follows, intertextuality ensures that these texts remain socially efficacious. Intertextuality refers to the relationship of one text to another text. According to Roland Barthes and Julia Kristeva, a text can be read only against a background of other texts we have already encountered.¹⁵ *Texture* is defined as a finely interwoven web of textual relationships (a textual environment) that binds both a text and its reader. Intertextuality and intertextual awareness has a ripple effect on the mind of the reader by creating expectations about the text to be read as well as by recasting, “*resemanticizing*”, texts previously read in light of the new material. It is therefore useful to

remember that my interpretations of Spain's foreign policy under Franco are equally embedded in intertextual relationships. One of my conscious entry points to those texts comes from Giddens's important account of the production of knowledge as originating from the double hermeneutic, which he characterized in the following terms: "sociological knowledge spirals in and out of the universe of social life, reconstructing both itself and the universe as an integral part of that process" (Giddens 1990, 15-16).¹⁶ Yet, as relevant as sources are, the list of unknowable sources that inform a reader's interpretation of a text is what makes intertextuality a powerful social and personal experience. Therefore, pointing to textual sources is not tantamount to relinquishing or holding interpretive independence/authority. All of the above suggest, that because language mediates our knowledge claims, and because these claims have constitutive power and are rendered from specific historical and socioeconomic conditions, multiple readings will continue to offer spaces of historical resistance and contestation.¹⁷

The Foreign Policy of Franco: A Crusader¹⁸ Without a Cause

The dictatorship dictates in order to endure and it endures in order to dictate...

Salvador de Madariaga (1992, 7)¹⁹

Although the number of works dealing with Franco's dictatorship has increased exponentially in the past twenty-five years,²⁰ its historiography can still benefit from greater interdisciplinarity and from a refusal to take histories produced during Franco's time at face value. I see my work as helping to erode the consensus that had been built around the official historiography of the regime. For this purpose, I introduce an alternative ontology for the study of Franco's foreign policy that casts light on the social arrangements that held the regime together for almost four decades.

The official historiography purported to create a historical ensemble that would justify the regime on the basis of an "unavoidable" civil war (see appendix). The inevitability of historical outcomes that made Franco's messianic intervention a necessity was a running theme on which the regime drew for both domestic and international legitimacy. Thus, my starting point is the outbreak of the civil war, for this is the most contested historical event of Spain's contemporary history and unquestionably the frame of reference for apologists and detractors of the regime.²¹ It is also the backdrop for Franco's foreign policy statements, particularly during the early stages of his regime.²²

What do we know about the civil war? We know the civil war was an armed conflict triggered in July 1936 by the insurrection of a section of the Spanish military against the legal and democratically elected government of Spain. We know that both sides of the conflict engaged in cruel killings and that the asymmetrical war capabilities between the sides determined the outcome. We know that these asymmetries stemmed largely from the considerable support, financial and military, that Franco received from Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy.²³ We know that the common good was forgotten for the private self, and that in turn, the private self of one man, Franco, was projected in the aftermath of the war into the auditorium of a desolate country as the arrival of the "Sentinel of the West," the knight in shining armor.²⁴ Finally, we know that the victorious side remained in power for almost forty years. It did so by silencing disagreement and condemning to exile any potential source of internal dissidence. It initially silenced *the other*, and rarely is this postmodernist buzzword as fitting as it is in this context, by ruthless means, but ruthlessness alone could not provide the *instrumental*

arguments needed for the legitimation of the regime. Subsequently, any alternative narration of the events that started in July 1936 was drowned out by the unbearable heaviness of words: words that pounded the minds of Spaniards in every radio station and newspaper, in every official declaration, with every deed that followed every mandate (directive speech act) for complete submission to the *Crusade*.²⁵

It is therefore relevant to ask about the origins of Franco's *Crusade*. Historically speaking, the imagery is revealing of how Franco construed social and political relations. There were two groups: the heretics who had brought about the wreckage of the "motherland" and the saviors who would restore *her* to the honor and glory of the days of yore. This binary division corresponds with the in-group and out-group categories that cognitive psychologists interested in social identity have identified.²⁶ If "placing people in situations of objective conflict" (Kowert 1998, 106) tends to foster the creation of distinct group identities, then Franco brought about his (di)vision of Spain by providing the belligerent conditions that turned it into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Franco was not a man of ideas. Irrespective of his strong military and dictatorial impulses, his vision of Spain faltered at the beginning of the military uprising and was oftentimes expressed in vague terms until his fervent adoption of fascism.²⁷ Franco's version of fascism would become a mix of the totalitarian influences of Germany and Italy and his own traditionalist views. Its main ingredients were: totalitarianism, nationalism, catholicism and corporatism (Armero 1978). Giddens's words regarding totalitarianism are particularly germane in understanding the changes that would take place in Spain and their long-lasting consequences: "totalitarian rule connects political, military, and ideological power in more concentrated form than was ever possible before the emergence of modern nation-states" (Giddens 1990, 8).

Franco saw Germany and Italy not only as reliable allies, but also as models for the construction of the totalitarian state. Subsequently, Franco's hagiographers would endeavor at great length to disassociate Franco from any connection with Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy by crediting him with, among other things, Spain's "neutral" position during WWII. This task has nonetheless proven a difficult one, for the overwhelming evidence shows that Spain was neither neutral during WWII, nor indifferent to the destinies of the Axis powers. In an article based on documents recently released by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paul Preston (1997) shows how Franco gave ongoing and enthusiastic strategic and industrial support to the Axis Powers during World War II, convinced until the very last moment that they would prevail. After the war, Spain became a haven for escaped Nazis, fascists and supporters of the Vichy government in France. Indeed, war criminals were expeditiously granted Spanish nationality so as to avoid their deportation and placate the raging Allied protests. "By the device of granting nationality to war criminals, it was possible to deny that they were given asylum" (Preston 1997, 84). Even though a thorough report produced by a subcommittee of the United Nations Security Council on May 31, 1946, concluded that there were two thousand to three thousand German Nazi officials, agents, and war criminals with substantial financial holdings in Spain, no real sanctions were adopted beyond the symbolic withdrawal of ambassadors from Madrid (Preston 1997, 85; see also Preston 1996). Even this response was provisional. On November 2, 1950, President Truman, who was known to be a strong critic of Franco, declared that it "would be a long, long time before there is an ambassador in Spain" (Byrnes 1999, 264). Yet a few weeks later, on December 27, Stanton Griffis was designated as the new American ambassador to Spain. This change of policy is generally attributed to the intense and successful lobbying campaign of the Spanish government in Washington, the conflicting interests within

Washington's bureaucratic politics, and the changing perceptions brought about by the beginning of the Cold War.

This complete about-face in U.S. foreign policy was not without consequences. At a critical moment, the United States guaranteed the international legitimacy that the regime so badly needed and put an end to the precarious economic and political isolation in which Franco was mired. These events contributed to the long-term survival of the regime. Moreover, because Franco had not significantly altered his policies, he was able to claim that the *Truth* had been affirmed, and that the very nations that had shunned Spain, had eventually shifted their position to recognize that they were in error (see appendix).

If we consider the outcry against communism and the 'capitalist' conspiracy of the Masons' to be at the heart of Franco's stated Crusade, then this shift in American policy is particularly striking: Truman was a known Mason.²⁸ Moreover, the United States had recently launched the Bretton Woods Institutions, and it had given serious consideration to a number of plans proposed by the Spanish Republican emissaries to the State Department to oust Franco from power and reestablish democracy. Ultimately, it had not been that long since Franco had exclaimed: "What joy to see the German bombers one day punishing the insolence of the skyscrapers of New York" (Byrnes 1999, 264).

How can we explain this dramatic shift in U.S. policy? The onset of the Cold War helped produce a change of mindset in American foreign policy. The East-West confrontation turned Spain's geopolitical location into an asset in its search for international recognition. Franco knew this and used it to considerable advantage as a negotiating tool, aware that the survival of his regime depended on the reformulation of American foreign policy (see appendix).

Hastily, the United States 'relaxed' its demands for expedient regime change and decided to pursue a 'pragmatic' foreign policy. The United States went from pressing to establish a UN embargo on Spain to supporting Spanish UN membership. While Spain was not a beneficiary of the Marshall Plan, it did receive some U.S. financial and military aid. Spain reciprocated by signing in 1953 the Madrid Pact, which consisted of a number of agreements allowing the establishment of military bases in Spain. Franco thus placed Spain's security at serious risk, subordinating the interests of the Spanish people to the goal of regime perpetuation. As Pollack notes, "Whilst there existed the possibility of becoming embroiled in a generalized East-West conflict, there was no guarantee of support in the case of reprisals against Spanish territory or during conflict within a scenario particularly threatening to Spain" (Pollack 1987).

The logic of self-perpetuation underpinning the policies of the regime at times bordered on a perverse irony. While Franco's anti-Communist crusade led to severe domestic repression and to the U.S.-backed international rehabilitation of his regime, it did not preclude him from eventually seeking to establish diplomatic relations with most Eastern bloc countries and with the Soviet Union itself. From time to time, an outcry against communism would be accompanied by the signing of a commercial, trade or educational agreement with a communist government. This policy brought uncertainty and tension to U.S.-Spanish relations, particularly at the height of the Cold War. To add to the ideological paradox, Franco had a very cordial relationship with Castro's Cuba, which he presented as the inevitable outcome of Spain's historical links with the island. He also maintained very friendly ties with the Arab world, which led him to refuse recognition to Israel, despite strong U.S. pressure to do so. Franco's relations with the Arab world brought Spain very few tangible *rewards*, but served the regime well in its legitimization strategy. In the early isolated and, as a result, isolationist years, the periodic visits of foreign envoys allowed Franco to play the simulacrum of respectability before the Spanish audience. The

service rendered by the Arab world was not free. Franco found himself supporting the Arab world in its clashes with Israel. The irony is that Franco's policy was taking place while the United States would ship military supplies to Israel via Spain.

Thus, Franco's opportunistic overtures to the communist world only exacerbated the growing uncertainty in U.S. foreign policy circles as well as his poor relationship with most of Spain's European neighbors, many of whom still had serious misgivings about Franco's credentials. The many reservations of most West European countries kept Spain out of Europe for all practical purposes. If the success of a state's foreign policy may be partially assessed by considering whether it is a member of international organizations in which its interests are at stake, then Spain's foreign policy under Franco must be characterized as an absolute failure. Spain under Franco was never allowed to join NATO or the European Community and only managed to extract a preferential trade agreement from the latter. It joined the Council of Europe two years after Franco's death. It was not a beneficiary of the Marshall Plan. It did not participate in the drafting of the UN Charter and was only permitted to join the UN after much maneuvering.

In short, the world still frowned upon the nature of the Franco regime. Yet Franco was not about to renounce *his* way of doing politics to win the favors of the Western world, as shown by his decision to carry out a number of executions in the last stages of his regime (1975), and the subsequent resolution by most states to remove their ambassadors from Spain (Mesa 1988, 10).

In reviewing the period from 1936 to 1975, I have to a large degree personified the regime. I believe that doing so is warranted by the nature of the regime and by the fact that Franco set himself up as the ruler and arbiter of every locus of political and social activity. To give an example, Article 6 of the Organic Law of the State read: "The Head of State is the supreme representative of the Nation; he is the embodiment of national sovereignty and exercises ultimate and absolute political and administrative authority."²⁹ From his command over an amalgamated coalition of supporting actors with little real power in the aftermath of the civil war to his shifting economic policies and alliances to his hand-picked selection of a personal successor,³⁰ Franco was the main formulator of policy.³¹ In this regard, Fernando Morán stated that "the foreign policy of the Francoist period (1939-1975) is, at the end of the day, a policy defined, inspired and overseen by Franco himself" (Armero, 1978, 15; my translation).

The emphasis on Franco's role does not deny a certain reduction of his role in the 1960s with the emergence of a more sophisticated economic technocracy or the role that dissident organizations played in effecting change in the regime. Rather, it indicates that economic policy still was meant to support the overall goals of the Franco regime as well as the political structure in place (see Franco's shifting economic policy statements in appendix), while dissident organizations had to confront a monolithic pattern of rule.

Put in abstract terms, the hierarchical nature of the institutions Franco commanded can hardly be denied. Directive rules are the most salient type of rules in "executive regimes" (Onuf's term, 1989) with a hierarchical structure of rule. Executive regimes are in turn characterized by a small group of actors who make all or most policy decisions. Yet, Franco did not secure hierarchy by issuing directives exclusively. In order to explain this paradox, an understanding of how rules make rule is necessary. In the case of Franco, the large number of assertive speech acts that he issued resulted both in hegemony in the realm of opinion, and hierarchy in the social and political milieus. This, as the next section shows, he did by relying on extralinguistic institutions and status.

To summarize and to return to my first assumption, dictatorships are forms of hegemonic and hierarchical rule characterized by small-group decision making that tend to make the links between public and foreign policy more discernible.

The Generation of Rule in Franco's Spain: Consequences for Foreign Policy

In order to understand Franco's regime and foreign policy, we need to go beyond historically problematizing the deeds of his regime to ask ourselves how these deeds were institutionalized into a pattern of rule. As far as rule and rules are concerned, the Franco era can be divided loosely into three periods (1936/39-1950; 1950-mid 1960s; mid 1960s-1975). While each of these periods was shaped by many overlapping rules, I argue here that in each period a single rule-type was dominant. In between these periods were transition years in which the rule mix began to shift, as there were recurrent lapses into earlier types of rule. These stages, above all, are the result of historical contingency, rather than the consequences of any preordained outcome. Nonetheless, earlier social arrangements distributed resources in such a way as to make certain outcomes likelier than others.

Before I discuss the rule mixes of the three main phases of the regime, a brief discussion about the interplay among these rules is particularly germane. Instruction rules are usually normatively weaker than directive rules. Therefore, they rely more heavily on performance and actualization to maintain a condition of rule. The social efficacy of directives, on the other hand, is not as closely tied to the ongoing performance of directive speech acts, but rather, once a rule has been established, to the ability of the issuer to sanction behavior in such a way as to encourage compliance. We can thus derive a general principle about the relationship between normativity and performance: instruction rules rely on ongoing performance and the status of the issuer; directives on sanctioning power; commissives on the acceptance, performance, and renewal of commitment.

For our purposes, it is important to recognize that Franco's assertive statements were directives for everyone else in his government. His status, as well as the other extralinguistic institutions that he could bring to bear made them so. Assertives that are backed up by extralinguistic institutions have strong normative force. This leads me to think that what I call *hierarchical hegemony* was the predominant form of rule in Franco's regime. Let us now turn to the three types of rules that characterized the periods suggested above.

Assertive speech acts and the rules derived from their ongoing performance would characterized the early parts of the regime. This is without a doubt the most declaratory stage of the regime and the one in which the most grandiose statements were issued. Evidence of this stage is perhaps most visible in Franco's staunch defense of his personal Crusade. As I suggested in the first section of this chapter, by believing the world to be divided, he made it so (see appendix). This is the nature of assertive speech acts: the world that they refer to comes about as it is represented. When Franco deployed material resources to bring his assertions to fruition, first by fostering a military uprising, and then by securing the financial and military support necessary to wage a civil war, he supported what the world of speech had already constructed. When assertives are most salient, hegemony results.

Hegemony refers to the promulgation and manipulation of principles and instructions by which superordinate actors monopolize meaning which is then passively absorbed by subordinate actors. These activities constitute a stable arrangement of rule because the ruled are rendered incapable of comprehending their subordinate role. They cannot formulate alternative programs of action because they

are inculcated with the self-serving ideology of the rulers who monopolize the production and dissemination of statements through which meaning is constituted. (Onuf 1989, 209-210)

Nonetheless, the declassification of material about the civil war by the U.S. State Department in the 1960s, the huge emigration wave of the late 1950s and 1960s, and increasing contact with the outside world through tourism eventually broke the monopoly of truth. Aware of this, the regime gradually shifted from a declaratory approach and a disproportionate reliance on assertive speech acts to a policy-making style that was less public but just as effective. One style of rule does not completely vanish or become supplanted by another one. Franco continued to craft all foreign policy engagements for domestic consumption and the customary high-sounding speech about the “historical uniqueness” of the Spanish regime was the usual accompaniment to these engagements.

Directive speech acts and the rules derived from their ongoing performance were more visible during the second stage of the regime. As the regime began to expand its administrative bureaucracy in order to run everyday life, the number of formal directives also increased. Yet, as has been argued, the regime had been hierarchically ruled all along. In this sense, constructivism benefits from explicitly stating what is usually implied: that competent agents are able to learn which rules are in place, even if these rules have never been *officially* issued. They do so by observing social consequences. Thus, sanctioned silence and the remarks of a head state whose standing was difficult to challenge effectively secured rule. What this tells us is that sanctions do not need to be formally stated to foster compliance with rules and to be collectively acknowledged. Yet, acknowledgement does not entail willful acceptance. The paradox here is that while the normative strength of directives is contingent on the status of the officer issuing them, their legitimacy, understood as social consensus about their issuance and use, is not. Chains of commands and bureaucracies are perceived to be legitimate when they have been enacted by agents whose standing has been secured through collectively approved means, usually elections. If heteronomy is the illusion of autonomy, then it is a useful illusion inasmuch as agents see the institutions of rule as derived from the legitimate *contests of wills*, rather than from the enforcement of authoritarian practices. If rule is the inescapable fact of social life, the illusion of autonomy is the basis for its contestation. Agents, by believing themselves autonomous, may act to enhance their autonomy. To return to the bureaucratic politics of the Franco regime is to acknowledge that the institutions of the regime tried to develop some independence on grounds of technocratic expertise. This was only partially achieved, as in the economic liberalization programs of the 1960s. When it came to matters of foreign policy, these institutions often had to find out which agreements “they” had signed or which rules “they” had put forth by reading the newspapers. This practice included some watershed events in foreign policy (Viñas 1984, 298).

Commitment rules are more conspicuous in the third stage of the regime. As the regime realized that its early attempt at autarky was not feasible, it relinquished some of the paraphernalia of self-sufficiency and began to embrace market capitalism. While this led to a period of directive rule, it would eventually signal a transition from the hegemonic rule of the state apparatus to heteronomous rule. Although the regime was determined to isolate domestic politics from foreign policy as well as from the economic reforms upon which the regime was embarking, this separation would prove untenable. The exchange of economic goods also introduced the commodification of culture (cultural goods to be precise), the control of which had been fundamental for the maintenance of a hegemonic regime. As the regime ceased to have complete control over the dissemination of statements, new loci of contestation gradually

emerged. These began to strengthen the underground trade unions and political parties and gave rise to new spaces for the articulation of alternative programs. These programs coalesced into a loose form of open opposition to the regime. Suddenly, even the Church began to be more self-critical, failing to condemn the support that some of its priests were lending to the dissidents. A working contract between Spain's civil society and the regime's dissidents slowly emerged. The return of civil society began to take place. (Pérez Díaz, 1993). As it happened, the instruction rules that had made Franco's regime a stable social arrangement became meaningless and his status as a crusader a historical anachronism.

We can finally draw some conclusions about the relationship among the three forms of rule, of which the Franco regime offers a good example. Hegemony legitimizes hierarchy, whereas hierarchy often provides the bureaucratic structure for the implementation of hegemony. In more liberal regimes, heteronomy provides the material basis for hegemony (Onuf 1989, 219). To the limited extent that the dictatorship (*dictadura*) can be said to have become a *dictablanda*, (and this remains only a possibility of which I am not altogether convinced), and to the extent that Franco adopted market reforms intended to improve the economic performance of his regime, heteronomy also functioned –at least in the early 1960s- to legitimize hegemonic social arrangements. Yet heteronomy also had the unintended consequences described above that would be key to the downfall of the regime.

Because a market economy is not the exclusive property of democracies,³² I am tempted to think of dictatorships as a combination of what Onuf called executive and monitory regimes.³³ It is worth noting that heteronomy is not a dominant form of rule in dictatorships, by which I mean that it is not usually the main form of rule mediating the relationship between the state and civil society. The state may nevertheless be engaged in heteronomous relations with other states. Yet, those who live under a dictatorship are under no *illusion of autonomy*, no matter how successful indoctrination of belief might have been. Therefore, if commitment-rules are the backbone of heteronomous relations, it is clearly not in the interest of the authoritarian state to encourage them, considering that even asymmetrical commitments create rights and duties for the parties entering them, something a dictatorship would logically not desire. This helps explain why as commitment rules became slowly more prominent in the final stage of the regime, the rug was pulled from under its previously heavy feet.

A critical reader may still be wondering how constructivism improves our understanding of history and foreign policy beyond casting both in different terms. Perhaps the primary historical justification of the regime, the *problem of order*, the prevailing chaos that made waging a civil war necessary, is nothing but a powerful metaphor. By explicating the construction of this metaphor, constructivism allows me to shed needed light on this critical aspect of the historiography of the regime.

To assert that order is a problem is to propose that the speaker thinks, and the hearer accepts, that order is a natural condition which is both desirable and achievable as a social condition. Figuratively “real,” the natural condition of order is different from, but still subject to comparison with, an implied, necessarily figurative representation of a state of affairs we might call “disorder” or “anarchy” (but not “chaos”, which would be incomparably different). (Onuf 1989, 157)

Following Onuf, I propose to conceptualize order differently, not as a problem for which there is a solution, but as a stable arrangement with distributional consequences that favors the promulgators or defenders of the order (Onuf 1989, 158). To put it even more bluntly, if order is an arrangement, who has arranged it and for what purposes? In the specific context of the Franco regime, the much sought-after order becomes far more problematic and questionable, for its

purveyors (*rhetorical exercises* notwithstanding) were not indifferent to the type of order being sought. Because the type of order Franco sought was very narrowly defined and excluded in the formulation process and in its consequences many of those who made up the collectivity known as Spain, order cannot be described as a collectively desired good, but as a useful self-justifying metaphor. Order understood as a metaphor that calls for its own justification can be fully grasped only if we revisit and expand my initial characterization of language as performative. In this extension of the role of language, “performative speech is also figurative speech [which] means that the ongoing (re)construction of reality is rarely distinguishable from the known, felt, lived-in world we “really” inhabit” (Onuf 1989, 157). This is possible because

insofar as any figure of speech is persuasive –it persuades us to see what we hear- it shifts whatever is undergoing construction into the realm of what the speaker guesses is already “real” to the hearer. When human beings speak performatively, we also speak figuratively, thereby shielding ourselves and others from the provisional nature of our assertions, directives, and commitments. (Onuf 1989, 157)

Franco’s dictatorship is a case in point of this dual nature of language. After his long regime, the world of speech/reality had changed to such an extent that writers who no longer had to work around the censorship machinery of the regime found it hard to get rid of the language mannerisms and habits, and the worlds these had created and represented, even though such linguistic devices were no longer necessary after the arrival of democracy. Some Spanish authors have referred to this ominous legacy as *Franquismo sociológico* or sociological Francoism (Alba 1978; see also 1980). Some of it may still be with us today (Jáuregui and Menéndez, 1995).

Conclusion

As claimed at the outset, a democratic society that has not *consciously* called its past to testify as witness to its present policy making can hardly call itself democratic. Spanish historiographers and policy makers, fearful that revisiting the past would put in danger what they presume to be a frail democracy, have often failed to do just that.

A reading of Spanish foreign policy and of Franco’s regime from a constructivist perspective has allowed me to put a contemporary school of thought, constructivism, in a very peculiar historical conjuncture: Could it provide forceful accounts of social relations that occurred prior to its own constitution as a set of concepts and propositions about the world? Could constructivism walk out of the narrative of social theory and into the forms of narration that are more closely associated with “history” yet remain forceful and coherent? As I hope to have demonstrated in this chapter, I believe that it should do so for empirical and normative reasons. To do so, constructivists and IR scholars alike will need to focus not only on what people construct, but also on what they think it is legitimate to construct within the internalized experiences of their history, society, and culture.

In writing a historical piece of this nature, much of my concern has been with memory and legitimation. This concern arises out of my belief that human beings always try to justify their actions by referring to some institutionalized past. By thinking of the past as an institutionalized backdrop, we engage in the appropriation of collective memory and, inevitably, in the *politics of memory* (Hirsch 1995; Thelen 1990; Barahona de Brito 2001).³⁴ The politics of memory sees collective memory as a contested site, because “the past is always constructed out of materials, as perceived in the present, and memory may be viewed as related to politics in the sense that ‘images of the past commonly legitimate a present social order’ (Connerton 1989, 3)

and are used to justify present policy (White 1973, 332; Nietzsche 1957, 209)” as cited by Hirsch (1995, 23). Moreover, we find memory political for two reasons. First, the meaning of the past is never unproblematic, especially in a dictatorship that emerged out of a bloody civil war. Second, developing an identity is inherently tied to our ability to act socially and demands from us that we interpret our place in the world. As Gillis reminds us, “identities and memories are not things we think about, but things we think with. As such they have no existence beyond our politics, our social relations and our histories” (Gillis 1994, 5). We write and *speak* our histories and construct our social relations by fitting words to world, world to world, and world to words. Foreign policy is no exception to this.

The formulation of foreign policy often requires the appropriation of the past. To the extent that policy makers must take stock of where they are in order to propose policies that represent the prospective fulfillment of their intentions, they must understand how they got there. In doing so, they will tend to create self-serving readings of the past, and not just any past. The past becomes then a coherent whole where history has moved relentlessly to make their proposed policies a de facto necessity.

The responsibility for producing the homogeneous past that results from unilinear assumptions about history lies both with policy makers and scholars. In writing about history, I am aware of the dangers posed by periodizing history. I am perhaps even more keenly aware of the pitfalls of narrativizing a past that was far more heterogeneous than a chapter of this length has allowed me to convey. Guilty as I am of having broken Franco’s regime into periods, I hope my readers will find merit in the focus on rules that it allows. Parsing these rules reveals social arrangements that are always historically contingent. Rules help us see the inherent contingency of all social arrangements, thus providing a way to go beyond the rigid vision of the past that periodization imposes.

I do not deny the possible narrativization of events as I told the story of the Franco regime. In fact, I have grave doubts about whether it is possible to *narrate* and not *narrativize*. These two terms represent for historians a conceptual and epistemological fault line that runs parallel to many contemporary debates in the philosophy of science and philosophy of language. I believe that this divide can be tentatively overcome by taking stock of the performative and representational properties of language (see previous section) and by postulating a different understanding of history. Thinking of history as the contested ground over collective memory, as historical constructivism urges us to do, sheds light on the fact that history has no inherent linearity and rather needs to be understood in two ways. First, history is a struggle over the appropriation of resources, by which I mean any tool that can be put to social use. One of the most fundamental social tools is language. Second, it is the subsequent or parallel discursive and social practices used to legitimate and justify this appropriation.

If collectivities expend resources on the politics of memory, it is because they have a stake in how the past is remembered. That collectivities care about how the past is remembered shows that “co-constitution”, the process by which people and society make history (Onuf 1989, 42), can only give us a ruled rendition of the past. History as contested ground, then, is synonymous with “*contests of wills*” or “*struggle*” (Onuf 1989, 5) over collective memory. These contests of wills generate rule by *directing*, understood as the use of resources to affect the disposition of a matter. (Onuf 1989, 5; emphasis added).

Direction results when some member or members prevail. What they say serves as a direction to others, with consequences that we think of as mapping the direction in which a matter goes [...] Finally, the directiveness of politics suggests that contests and consequences are asymmetrical. Some members of a

social unit prevail more often than others do, and they benefit more from having done so. (Onuf 1989, 5; emphasis added)

If directing is political and if remembering is at the core of politics, as suggested above, then it follows that directing is inextricably tied to (the politics of) memory. Furthermore, if directiveness is asymmetrical, then so will be the politics of memory, that is, the struggles over the collective memory of a people. Finally, if ruling is about directing contests of wills, and if we suppose a memory of past events, then the creation of patterns of rule over time has something to do with the ways in which collective memory is individually and endogenously internalized and produced and exogenously reinforced or weakened through formality and institutionalization (Onuf 1989, 127). These two processes –internalization and externalization- take place simultaneously and neither has causal or temporal primacy.³⁵ Thus, collective memory as a social practice and as an institutionalized backdrop for future individual and collective action is also co-constituted. This is an insight of importance for foreign policy analysis.

If this is a sound conclusion, then one may begin to see constructivism not only as a tool to redescribe the world as it is, but also as a useful roadmap to redescribe and revisit the past. To do so, constructivism will have to embrace its conceptual cognate, historical constructivism, which explicitly sets out to deal with the temporality of social action and the questions it raises. Yet one does not revisit just any past. Historical constructivism presents a landscape populated by people and the things they do. Normative considerations, no longer a threat to the human activity we call research, take central stage as one begins to ask who is doing the ruling and for what purposes. In answering these questions, we discover that different policy alternatives rely as much on different assumptions and justifications about the past as they do on prospective policy goals and the means to achieve these. In this respect, Onuf's account of policy making in this book misses one very important point. Understanding the making of policy cannot proceed solely from an analysis of the statements of assertion, direction, and commitment made by speakers engaged in strategically interactive games.³⁶ It must first and foremost offer an account of how history has shaped the speakers' perceptions of what statements could or should be legitimately made. Neither can foreign policy analysis be reduced to the process of "getting inside someone's head" (a dubious empirical exercise), as foreign policy analysts have often attempted. Rather, what is needed is an understanding of how ruled renditions of history are socially sanctioned and of how this process in turn affects the making of foreign policy.

Thus, I propose that foreign policy analysis must first grasp how policy makers attempt to bring their policy goals into line with the internalized experiences of the polity whose collective good they claim to represent and pursue. It is just as important to study the ways policy makers try to reconstruct the collective experience of a polity in terms more favorable to their policy goals. Only then can foreign policy analysis search for the ways interaction has shaped the rules of the games in which different players find themselves.

By focusing on history and memory, FPA scholars and constructivists alike will be able to ask fresh questions and maybe build bridges between their specialized literatures. Constructivists who often call attention to agency might find in the study of memory a chance to see the human face of social construction. Foreign policy analysis may gain relevance by renouncing the quest for generality, so endemic to the positivist enterprise, in favor of the study of contextual decision-making. Were this prescription to be taken seriously, both groups of scholars would strengthen through their pursuits one of the foundations of democratic society: its ability to face the past.

Appendix³⁷

This appendix is a small but illustrative collection of statements made by Franco. It is not intended to be final in any manner. On occasion, I have included a few statements by key actors to provide necessary context. The reader should note that while the content of the statements is faithfully reproduced, it may not be found in the same category of speech as in the original. This, however, should be a minor concern, since the majority of the statements here reproduced are collections of assertives, which tend to lend themselves more readily to the task of transculturation and translation.

Ours is not a civil war, a partisan war, an “insurrectionist” war. It is rather a *Crusade* of men who believe in God, who believe in the human soul, who believe in goodness, who believe in idealism, who believe in sacrifice, against those men who lack faith, morals, or honesty. (Viñas 1984, 60).

General Franco, November 16, 1937

Our conflict goes beyond national borders and becomes a *Crusade* where the future of Europe will be decided. (Viñas 1984, 141)

General Franco, July 18, 1938.

Spain’s war is not an artificial thing: it is the culmination of a historical process. It is the fight of the motherland against the anti-motherland, of unity against secession, of morality against crime; of the spirit against materialism. The only possible outcome is the triumph of the pure and eternal principles over the bastardized and anti-Spanish ones. (Viñas 1984, 98)

General Franco, August 27, 1938

Dear bishops [...]:

You know better than I that the History of Spain is intimately tied to that of its monasteries; they helped our monarchs wrestle with their problems and pointed our saints and caudillos to God’s path. They were also our trusted champions of unity. I fulfill with my visit a tradition of Heads of State in Spain: to happily pay homage to the Virgin who witnessed so many of our feats. At her service I only fulfilled my duties: I lent my arm and will. But, victory, victory only God can give, moved undoubtedly by your prayers. After liberating Spain from the Red hordes and reestablishing the worship of God and opening up the doors of the monasteries, we still have some unfinished work: to safeguard the motherland. A nation-state only exists when it has a Head of State, an army to defend her and a people to aid her. Our Crusade showed we have the Head of State and the Army, we need now a people. We only have a people when there is unity and discipline in a nation. The battle has therefore not ended. Thus, I ask for your collaboration and prayers in service of God and for the greatness of the motherland. (Armero 1978, 28)

General Franco, January 25, 1942

The army constitutes the backbone of our fatherland...The sacred mission of a nation’s armies consists in maintaining order, and this is the mission which we have accomplished (Gallo 1974, 11).

General Franco, April 28 1956

[...] these children are not responsible [for what happened]. And they represent the Spain of the future. We want to *teach* them to say some day: true, Falangist Spain shot our fathers, but it was because they deserved it. On the other hand, it gave us care and comfort in our childhood. Those who in spite of everything might still hate us at twenty would be the worthless ones. The dregs

The above Statement was made by Carlos Croocke, Head of Informaciones e Investigaciones (The Falange Police) (Gallo 1974, 106).

I have grouped the following statements in a box because they summarize quite well some of the changes in Spanish foreign policy over the years. My comments are bolded. They can be found in Viñas (1984, 209, 288):

Box: Evolution of Spanish Foreign Policy in Franco's Time

From the isolationist years/ and the advantages of autarchy:

Spain is a privileged country: we are entirely self-sufficient. We have all we need to live and our production is abundant enough to ensure our livelihood. We do not need to import anything. (August 18, 1938)

Our victory is the triumph of those economic principles that are in complete opposition to the old liberal theories which allowed the colonial patronage to take over many sovereign nations (June 5, 1939)

We are facing two fronts, Western sectarianism and Asian Communism. They both promote the foreign campaigns against the motherland... The Truth and Reason will always be on Spain's side. Yet, it is not the peoples of these nations that are against us, but rather the sectarian politics of the opinion machinery of these states [...] (May 14, 1946)

Spain regains a place in the world. Defending our independence not only serves our supreme national interest, but we are also the strongest buffer zone against communism. Therefore, when Western Europe criticizes us, it is undermining its future security. (October 1, 1946)

What unfortunate destiny awaits a nation that has trust in the good will of other nations! We must only trust ourselves. We must be ready to defend ourselves and to tighten our belts, should it become necessary [...] (May 15, 1947).

To the early attempts to join the EEC:

We are central to any notion of Western resistance. We, as a country, first defeated communism. We are the most solid fortress of the Western world. (May 28, 1962)

The economic life of a people cannot exist in isolation from the world around it. It is rather closely tied to the economic life of other states (December 13, 1947)

As a European country, we have decisively contributed to the formation of the idea of Europe. We cannot be left by the wayside of the great unifying project that is currently taking place [in reference to the EEC] (December 30, 1969)

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Nicholas Onuf's important contributions helped lay the foundations for historical constructivism, the approach to the study of history and foreign policy that is central to this chapter. Vendulka Kubálková encouraged me to proceed with the development of historical constructivism when it was still in its embryonic stage. Paul Kowert went above and beyond the call of collegiality in giving me thoughtful commentary on this chapter. Pamela Blackmon first brought to my attention Herbert Hirsch's work, for which I am very thankful. I am also thankful to the members of the Miami International Relations Group for creating an intellectually challenging community out of a barren academic landscape. Finally, my deepest appreciation goes to Martha Arrázola and Claudia Grigorescu for their love, friendship, and support. The usual disclaimer applies.

Notes

1. My translation of the sentence "No está ni el mañana –ni el ayer– escrito" found in Machado's poem "El Dios Ibero" (Machado 1997, 155).
2. I take to heart the cautionary remarks made by Nicholas Onuf with regards to the casual use of the term "policy". See Onuf (1999) and his chapter in this book.
3. Unless otherwise stated, when I speak of constructivism in this chapter, I am referring specifically to rule-oriented constructivism.
4. For a thorough exposition of constructivism as an alternative ontology and for a review of its conceptual and intellectual antecedents, see Onuf (1989).
5. See Michael Collier's chapter for a useful summary of how rules function in constructivism: "Rules tell people what they should do, what they must do, and what they have a right to do." Using rules always has normative and distributional intended and unintended consequences. Thus, constructivism links agents' intentions and actions to the material world.
6. See Steve Smith's chapter in this book for a position closer to mine. Also Smith (1996, 1-37).
7. Some of the latest findings in cognitive science seem to support this view. See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999). Lakoff and Johnson's research seriously undermines the traditional separation in philosophy between reason and emotion, brain and mind, and so forth. If their findings hold, nothing short of a complete revision of the assumptions of Western philosophy should follow. One suspects that cognitive psychology, linguistics, semiotics, and most of the social sciences would also do well to revise their basic assumptions about what it is to think and to be rational.
8. For a different view on this issue, see Wendt (1999) and (1996). Because Wendt downplays or even denies the role that domestic politics can play as a source for and a context from which foreign policy emanates, he disqualifies himself for the type of historical social theory that I am interested in. See Smith's chapter in this book and Smith (2000) for an outstanding critique of Wendtian constructivism. Rule-oriented constructivism not only does not deny these influences, but it also provides an empirically viable approach for the study of history and foreign policy as I intend to show in this chapter.
9. In constructivist terms, language is performative because it allows us to "perform social acts and achieve ends by making statements of assertion, direction, and commitment". See Onuf (1989). One of the earliest uses of the term "performance" can be found in Chomsky's generative grammar. For Chomsky, performance refers to "the actual use of language in concrete situations" as opposed to competence, or "the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language". (Chomsky 1965, 4). For a critique of the division between competence and performance and of Chomskian linguistics, see Robinson (1973). For a useful review of Chomsky's Universal Grammar, see Cook (1994).
10. I define a negative response as the type of response given to policy declarations that are not issued to elicit an active reaction or an expression of consent, but rather passive compliance, either by coercive or oppressive means or on the promise of a scenario that adherence to them is supposed to create.

11. Heywood's words on the issue of consistency are revealing of the usual and unwarranted divide between foreign policy and domestic politics that most IR scholars espouse: "Under the dictatorship Spain's foreign policy had been subordinated to the domestic demands of the regime, leading to a lack of internal coherence" (Heywood 1995, 261). On the fixity and coherence of policies, and on the inferences of observers about policies, see Onuf's chapter in this book.

12. Please note that I did not hasten to use the word "demise." The rough draft of the epitaph of the Franco regime may be said only to have been written after the inauguration of the Constitution of 1978. Even then, as the attempted coup of 1981 proved, the dead were still rolling in their graves (many would say that they still are).

13. While I agree with Armero on this point, I believe his study of Spain's foreign policy would have been much more fruitful had he not established the customary and unjustified separation between public and foreign policy. Having said this, his book does not share any of the structuralist realist assumptions that would become so widespread with Waltz's publication of *Theory of International Politics* in 1979.

14. Cox makes the following useful remarks about the link between memory and history: "Mind is [...] the thread connecting the present with the past, a means of access to a knowledge of the changing modes of social reality" (Cox 1981, 130). For a review of the challenges that historical narration presents, see White (1992).

15. Constructivists can make good use not only of more mainstream work, *id est.*, game theory and interactionism, but also of many of the insights developed by poststructuralist scholars. See Barthes (1976) Kristeva (1986) and Orr (1991).

16. See also Giddens (1976).

17. I find myself here at a paradox: I find Habermas's theory of communicative action useful in attempting to explain the "adjudication and sanctioning" of validity claims, at least within Western societies, yet I share with antifoundationalist scholars an emphasis on language as not only performance but also as play. I also share their preoccupation with power/knowledge. Giddens's comments on power and the use of knowledge are illustrative of this concern, albeit from a strictly "modernist" position. See Giddens (1990, 44). Also instructive for students and scholars interested in pursuing/clarifying this paradox is Habermas's exploration of the tension between validity and facticity as he searches for the "conceptual or internal relation, and not a simply contingent historical association, between the rule of law and democracy" (Habermas 1998, 449).

18. For declarations regarding the Crusade, see the appendix. Note that Franco's appropriation of this term was aided by the use that the top of the Catholic hierarchy made of it. The bishops of Pamplona, Vitoria, and Salamanca referred to Franco's insurrection as such. See Armero (1978, 36-37).

19. Madariaga's work is a tour de force of compelling evidence about Franco's abuses in the formulation and subsequent justification of domestic and foreign policy. The book compiles a collection of chronicles that were aired through Radiodifusion Française into Spanish territory between 1954 and 1957. The significance of this undertaking lies in that it was one of the few attempts to counteract Franco's propaganda campaign by providing thoughtful and critical commentary and accurate evidence of how Franco's misinformation campaign worked.

20. A couple of good examples are Fontana (1986) and Payne (1987).

21. Current scholarly interest in the civil war as well as political divisions over the writing of its history serve as an indication of how unsettling and divisive an event it remains. For instance, Spain's ruling party, the conservative Partido Popular, met with hostility a recent proposal by all the remaining parties represented in the Spanish Congress to condemn the "fascist uprising that led to the civil war." For a chronicle of this particular event, see Larraya (1999). For a recent book on the death, retaliation behind the front lines, and repression that Spaniards endured as the result of the civil war, see Juliá and Casanova (1999).

22. Mesa claims that the defining feature of Spain's foreign policy was its unwavering support for the ideology that emerged victorious in the civil war, see Mesa (1988, 19) and Grugel and Rees (1997).

23. See Viñas (1984). Viñas's well-researched book is one of the best sources for the links of the Franco Regime to Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy. It also provides an insightful comparative economic history of the civil war and of the "first stages" of the regime.
24. Galinsoga's 'work' is possibly the best example of the attempted appropriation of collective memory (Galinsoga 1956). For an interesting overview of work on public memory, please see Thelen (1990).
25. The historical symbolism and relevance of the *Crusade* lies in its link to a previous mode of political organization, *id est*, the beginning of the empire, which had been established following national unification in the fifteenth and sixteenth century. The symbolic resonance of Latin America as a previous imperial enclave is particularly salient in Franco's formulation of Hispanidad as an alternative worldview opposed to Anglo-Saxon capitalism.
26. For an interesting review of the literature, see Kowert (1998). Note that this same analytical distinction was implied by the expression "las dos Españas," which both pro-Franco and critical historiographers have used at length.
27. Franco's speeches of July 17 and 25 of 1936 are full of ambiguity and even contradictions. One of them ends with "Long live the Republic", see Armero (1978, 23).
28. Franco's hostility for Masonry never waned. On the last speech he ever made, delivered at the Plaza de Oriente on the 1 of October of 1975, he referred again to the dangers posed to the regime by freemasonry.
29. Artículo Sexto de la Ley Orgánica del Estado (my translation).
30. According to Morán and the classified documents he was allowed to consult, Franco took direct clues from Mussolini regarding the education of the prince of Spain and his designation as Franco's successor. See Fernando Morán in the prologue to Armero's book (1978, 15).
31. Legislative bills and decrees would be routinely read and passed by the make-believe parliament. They would sometimes vote, as in the case of Spain's asymmetrically disastrous military agreements with the United States, without specific knowledge of what they entailed.
32. Onuf's comments on the reach of heteronomous relations are particularly germane here: "Political Economy is limited to the study of heteronomy, but heteronomy is not limited to the market" (Onuf 1989, 224). Also of interest is the growing consensus in the field of International Political Economy to suggest that democracies have fewer transaction costs and are therefore more friendly to the market.
33. Onuf's discussion of regimes referred primarily to international actors (Onuf 1989, 144-154). Yet, since his form of constructivism calls into question the boundary lines between the national and international, I do not see any good reasons for not extending his three categories of regimes to other social settings. Thus, I use the term "regime" in the standard non-IR sense of a prevailing social system. By doing so, we extend the conceptual reach of regimes to include systems of rule at any level of social construction. I believe this is consistent with general constructivist tenets, with my methodological approach to the study of the making of foreign policy, and with my discussion of legitimacy. Note that Onuf groups monitory regimes under "the category of existence and the constitution/regulation of its meaning in space and of time". Executive regimes fall under "the category of material control and the constitution/regulation of modalities of control." See his synoptic table named "faculties of experience" (Onuf 1989, 291).
34. For a very revealing analysis of the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent strategies deployed by different parties in the disputes to which the politics of memory gave rise, see Aguilar Fernandez (1998, 52 1996a 1996b).
35. For a discussion of externalization and internalization of rules, see Onuf (1989, 130-131).

36. For a different discussion of games, of the importance of history and context, see Fierke's (2001) Wittgensteinian contribution.

37. Because all of these extracts were taken from speeches that are readily and freely available in the public realm, I believe that my quoting from some of the sources below constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the United States Copyright Law. The primary reason for quoting from these sources is to facilitate access to them, since it would be easier for an American reader to locate these than the actual statements. Whenever possible I have turned to documents published by the Spanish government. I have provided all translations unless otherwise noted, with the exception of statements found in Gallo (1969). I identify in parenthesis the source where the statement was found.

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